How To Get A Job With Obama Administration – On January 28, 2009, barely a week into his presidency, Barack Obama met with the top generals and admirals of the US military on his own turf, inside the “Tank”, at the second floor of the Pentagon at the Joint Chiefs of Staff Conference. met in the room. A senior official remembered the new president as “remarkably confident, prepared, relaxed, but respectful, trying not to act too much as commander in chief”. Obama walked around the room, introducing himself to everyone; He thanked them and the entire armed forces for their service and sacrifice; Then he sat down for an independent discussion on the challenges of the world, region by region, crisis by crisis. He was an “absolute man,” the official said, fluent in every issue, but more than that—a surprise to the authorities, which was a surprise to this young, inexperienced Democrat—he displayed a dark streak of realism.
At one point, Obama remarked that he was not the kind of person who wanted to be able to park wherever he wanted while driving down the street. If he sees an open space, even one that requires some tricky parallel parking, he’ll be fine to squeeze into it. Obama’s meaning was clear: he had suffered a nasty hand (two unpopular wars, isolated allies, the deepest recession in decades), but he would find a way to deal with the world as it were.
How To Get A Job With Obama Administration
Seven years later, many officials and defense officials, some of whom were initially so impressed by Obama, view their presidency as following a different style of governance. They appreciate historic achievements – the Iran nuclear deal, the opening to Cuba, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the prevention of another terrorist attack on American soil (so far) – and they acknowledge that they often tried to do their best. is option. But too often, he says, he has avoided taking action, waiting for conditions to get better – circling the block and, in his own metaphor, waiting for a better parking spot to open.
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It is a general criticism of Obama’s foreign policy: that he avoids harsh decisions, that he is allergic to military force if it risks American casualties or escalation, that there is often a mismatch between his words and his actions. “It’s a pattern,” said a retired four-star general. “He issues a stern warning, then does nothing. It damages American credibility.”
Is the allegation true? And to the extent that it has some legitimacy, how much can be placed at Obama’s feet, and how much should be held accountable for the problems he has faced? Would a different kind of president have handled the challenges of the decade better, and if so, how?
The following examination of key crises and decisions is based on conversations with dozens of officials during Obama’s presidency and specifically interviews with 20 mid- to senior-level officials (past and present, almost all based on backgrounds). Article.
In December 2009, Obama went to Oslo to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. The award was premature to say the least, but he used his acceptance speech to set out the principles of a foreign policy he was expected to adhere to – one of the tensions between idealism and realism. Sophisticated fighting. It was a courageous speech for the recipient of the Peace Prize. “Saying that force may sometimes be necessary is not a call for cynicism,” he said. “This is the recognition of history, the imperfection of man and the limit of reason.” Nations must “adhere to the standards that govern the use of force,” and a just, lasting peace must be “based on the inherent rights and dignity of each individual.” Yet, “America cannot act alone,” except in matters of vital national interest, and only lofty rhetoric about human rights maintains “a crippling position.” Association with oppressive regimes may lack “satisfactory purity of anger”, but “no repressive regime can embark on a new path unless it has the option of opening doors.”
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“When people ask me to summarize [Obama’s] foreign policy, I ask them to take a closer look at that speech,” said Obama’s deputy national security adviser for strategic communications, Benjamin Rhodes. Another former top White House official called it “a blueprint for how to deal with problems”, “a framework for how it thinks about American power.” Whether he adhered to that template—the way he grappled in action with the tensions identified in theory—would, by his own standard, be the measure of his presidency.
The early years of Obama’s tenure were marked by challenges inherited from the Bush administration, particularly the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, in early 2011, a series of new problems emerged, as domestic protests against authoritarian leaders broke out across the Middle East. The Ben Ali regime in Tunisia fell in January, and the Mubarak regime in Egypt came in early February. By the end of February, rebels opposing Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi had taken control of cities such as Benghazi, and the dictator’s days seemed numbered. But then the tide of the war turned, and Qaddafi’s army moved forward to quell the rebellion.
With thousands of civilian lives at risk, the Obama administration, which had come out in support of the rebels, was faced with a difficult choice. The members of the Arab League unanimously called on the United States to join. NATO allies were willing to intervene in support of the armed insurgents, and work on a UN Security Council resolution was underway. At a National Security Council meeting called to discuss the crisis, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, US Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice and some of Obama’s NSC staff called for action, citing moral imperatives and the potential for truly multilateral force. argued for. But according to many present at the meeting, Pentagon officials resisted intervening, pointing out that the United States had no significant interest in Libya and that any serious commitment would hinder Washington, possibly for years. Will give
Two options were presented to the president: to go all the way as leader of the coalition, or not to go at all. Obama’s response was to come up with a third way, which came up when he thought out loud about the problem. Initially, he articulated the principles that would underpin any course he chose: No U.S. Allied-US forces would provide their own unique capabilities (among them precision bombing and intelligence sharing), but American allies, who had a far greater interest in the outcome of the conflict, borne the brunt of protecting Libyan civilians and restoring order after the battle. Will have to suffer
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, an Obama adviser (whose identity remains unknown) dubbed this approach “leading from the back”, a term that would come in for much derision. But in context, it made sense, and it fits Obama’s view on the role and limitations of military force, the distinction between interests and vital interests, and the need to align the instruments of power with the intensity of those interests. .
The first phase of the resulting operation was ultimately successful. A combination of US air strikes and intelligence, NATO air support, and rebel movements on the ground resulted in the defeat of Qaddafi’s forces and (though this was not the apparent purpose of the campaign) the assassination of the Libyan leader himself. But the second phase was a failure: a new government was never fully formed, the feuds of the rebel factions turned into civil war, and the country’s social system (as it were) collapsed.
The problem was that NATO allies, who had promised to lead Libya’s stabilization phase after Qaddafi, did not comply, as the phase turned out to be more violent than they expected. Restoring (or, indeed, creating) order would require armed intervention – and possibly serious combat – on the ground, a mission for which European states had little capability and little appetite.
Obama acknowledged the failure in his September 2015 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, saying, “Even as we helped the Libyan people end the regime of a tyrant, our coalition has lagged behind.” More should have been done to fill the void left. And the lesson weighed heavily on him as he contemplated how to deal with a similar crisis in Syria.
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As the Arab Spring developed, demonstrations broke out in Damascus against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Assad retaliated with extreme force, killing protesters first by hundreds, then by thousands. Gradually, a rebel power emerged and the country plunged into civil war. The United States has already intervened in Libya under similar circumstances, naturally raising the question of whether it would intervene in Syria as well.
At a meeting of the NSC, Obama explained the difference between the two conflicts. The Battle of Libya took place in an open desert, which allowed clear targeting; Syria was embroiled in an urban war, in which civilians, rebels and soldiers clashed. Libyan rebels
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